






































































































































How Does Slack Inﬂ  uence Inﬂ  ation?
Richard Peach, Robert Rich, and Anna Cororaton
Economists have long studied the relationship between resource 
utilization and inﬂ  ation. Theory suggests that when ﬁ  rms use 
labor and capital very intensively, production costs tend to rise 
and ﬁ  rms have more scope to pass those cost increases along in 
the form of higher product prices. In contrast, when that level of 
intensity is relatively low—that is, when the economy is operating 
with slack—production costs tend to rise more slowly (or even 
fall) and ﬁ  rms have less scope for raising prices. Empirical 
evidence, however, has varied concerning the exact nature of the 
relationship between resource utilization and inﬂ  ation. In this 
study, the authors reexamine this relationship by evaluating the 
presence of “threshold effects.” They ﬁ  nd that the level of intensity 
of resource utilization must be below or above certain critical 
values before it can help to forecast movements in inﬂ  ation. 
U
nderstanding the role that resource utilization—a gauge of the balance 
between aggregate demand and supply in an economy—plays in the inﬂ  ation 
process is an important issue, particularly at a time when the unemployment 
rate remains stubbornly high. Economic theory predicts that inﬂ  ation will increase 
when an economy is operating above its potential—when ﬁ  rms are likely to be using 
labor and capital very intensively—and will slow when operating below its potential. 
And, in fact, this relationship is borne out by empirical analysis of post–World War II 
U.S. data up to the mid-1980s: When the unemployment rate was relatively low, the 
rate of inﬂ  ation increased. Conversely, when the unemployment rate was relatively 
high, inﬂ  ation slowed. Surprisingly, however, over the period from the mid-1980s 
through the mid-2000s, the relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
level of inﬂ  ation proved very weak at best, leading some commentators to conclude 
that measures of resource utilization might no longer be useful predictors of future 
changes in the rate of inﬂ  ation.
Other commentators, however, have viewed this mixed empirical evidence as 
support for the hypothesis that the level of resource utilization must exceed or fall 
below certain thresholds before it has a meaningful impact on inﬂ  ation. In other 
words, the unemployment rate will help predict future inﬂ  ation only when it is 
above or below critical values, as it occasionally was over the period from the 
end of World War II through the mid-1980s. By contrast, the unemployment rate 
will have little power to predict inﬂ  ation during periods when movements of the 
unemployment rate are relatively muted—such as the period between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-2000s that economists call the “Great Moderation.” 
In this edition of Current Issues, we evaluate this hypothesis using a model that 
relates the rate of inﬂ  ation to the unemployment gap—the difference between the 
actual unemployment rate and the non-accelerating inﬂ  ation rate of unemployment, 2
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or NAIRU.  As its name suggests, the NAIRU is that level of the 
unemployment rate at which there is no tendency for inﬂ  ation to 
increase or decrease. We use this model to gauge the presence of 
thresholds beyond which the relationship between inﬂ  ation and 
the unemployment gap becomes stronger in both economic and 
statistical terms. We also examine the model’s ability to forecast 
“core” inﬂ  ation—an inﬂ  ation measure that excludes volatile food 
and energy prices—over the period from 2008 through the end 
of 2010. 
The results of our analysis indicate that the impact of the 
unemployment gap on inﬂ  ation differs markedly within and 
outside the estimated thresholds, with economically and statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant effects associated with deviations of the unem-
ployment rate from the NAIRU larger than 1.6 percentage points 
in absolute value.  In addition, we ﬁ  nd that the model-generated 
forecasts of inﬂ  ation have generally tracked the slowing of core 
inﬂ  ation over the 2008-10 period. We conclude that these results, 
taken together, provide general support for the notion that the 
unemployment gap must be below or above certain threshold 
values before it can help to predict movements in inﬂ  ation and 
thereby serve as a useful guide for monetary policymakers. 
Background
The inverse relationship between inﬂ  ation and unemployment 
is the deﬁ  ning feature of the “Phillips curve,” named for the 
New Zealand–born economist A. W. Phillips. In a 1958 study 
of U.K. economic data from 1861 to 1957, Phillips documented 
that nominal wages had grown faster during periods when 
the unemployment rate was low; when unemployment was 
high, wages had grown more slowly. Subsequent interpreters 
of Phillips’ empirical ﬁ  ndings saw the relationship between 
wage inﬂ  ation and unemployment as a stable one that would 
allow analysts to predict how the inﬂ  ation rate would change in 
response to particular movements in the unemployment rate. 
Today, after ﬁ  fty years of additional research, a modiﬁ  ed 
version of the Phillips curve—the “expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve”—is a widely used tool for explaining and fore-
casting inﬂ  ation.  In this version, the rate of inﬂ  ation is deter-
mined by a combination of inﬂ  ation expectations, some measure 
of the overall state of resource utilization, and variables that 
capture supply shocks such as large, sharp changes in commodity 
prices. Commonly used measures of the state of resource utiliza-
tion are the unemployment gap (deﬁ  ned earlier) and the output 
gap—actual GDP relative to the economy’s maximum  sustain-
able output, or “potential GDP.”1 All else equal, the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve posits that conditions of slack in the 
economy—that is, “activity gap” measures indicating that output 
1 Potential GDP is that level of real output at which inﬂ  ation would remain stable.  
The potential growth rate of real GDP is that at which the unemployment rate 
would remain unchanged.
and employment are below their potential levels—will lead to a 
decline in inﬂ  ation and vice versa.2
The relationship between inﬂ  ation and resource utilization 
over the last ﬁ  fty years is shown in Chart 1. The chart presents 
a long time series of the four-quarter change in the growth rate 
of the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deﬂ  ator, 
which excludes energy and food.3 Also plotted is the unemploy-
ment gap, measured as the difference between the actual 
unemployment rate and the estimate of the NAIRU produced 
by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce (CBO).  Clearly visible are 
episodes in which the actual unemployment rate was above the 
NAIRU and inﬂ  ation subsequently fell—as well as episodes in 
which the actual unemployment rate was below the NAIRU and 
inﬂ  ation subsequently rose. Also evident, however, are periods in 
which the linkage between the variables appears to be rather weak.
2 Going forward, we will refer to the expectations-augmented Phillips curve 
simply as the Phillips curve for ease of exposition.
3 Letting πt denote the (annualized) growth rate in the core PCE deﬂ  ator index 
from quarter t–1 to quarter t, the series is deﬁ  ned as πt+4–πt . The plot of the 
series in quarter t depicts the value of (πt+4–πt ), with positive (negative) values 
representing an increase (decrease) in the level of inﬂ  ation over the next year. 
   The PCE deﬂ  ator, published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, is the price 
index for all goods and services consumed by the household sector, regardless of 
who pays for those goods and services. It differs in scope from the more familiar 
consumer price index (CPI), which is a price index of goods and services that 
households pay for out of pocket. Like the core CPI, the core PCE deﬂ  ator excludes 
food and energy. However, in the case of the PCE deﬂ  ator, only food purchased for 
off-premises consumption is excluded, while food consumed “away from home” 
(at a restaurant) is included in the core measure.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; 
Congressional Budget Office. 
Notes: The unemployment gap is the difference between the actual unemployment 
rate and the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of the non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Core PCE inflation is the personal consumption 
expenditures deflator excluding food and energy. 
Chart 1
The Unemployment Gap and Core PCE Inflation:
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10 05 00 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 1959Another way of viewing the relationship between resource 
utilization and inﬂ  ation is presented in Chart 2, where the data 
in Chart 1 now appear in the form of a scatter-plot. Each dot 
represents an observation of the four-quarter change in core PCE 
deﬂ  ator inﬂ  ation and the corresponding value of the unemploy-
ment gap. The dots are color coded to separate pre-1984 (blue) 
and post-1984 (orange) observations.  Note that the estimated 
slope of the pre-1984 observations is relatively steep, whereas the 
slope of the post-1984 observations is quite shallow.  Speciﬁ  cally, 
the estimated slope over the post-1984 period is less than half the 
value observed over the pre-1984 period. The implication is that 
the relationship between the unemployment gap and inﬂ  ation 
weakened in the post-1984 period.  
The tenuous relationship between resource utilization and 
inﬂ  ation over the post-1984 period could be interpreted as evi-
dence of a long-term structural change in the economy that has 
made the Phillips curve relationship much less useful as a tool 
for forecasting inﬂ  ation. Consider, however, that the period from 
the mid-1980s through the mid-2000s was unusually stable from 
a macroeconomic perspective.  Output gaps and unemployment 
gaps were relatively small, and measured inﬂ  ation expectations 
were relatively low and stable. Consequently, while the data 
indicate a weakened relationship between slack and inﬂ  ation, 
this evidence could be an artifact of the “Great Moderation.” 
Another look at Chart 2 offers some preliminary support for this 
claim: the pre-1984 period exhibits more extreme values of the 
unemployment gap than does the post-1984 period.
Earlier Views on the Predictive Power 
of the Phillips Curve
How useful is the Phillips curve in forecasting inﬂ  ation over a 
one-to-two-year horizon?  In a very inﬂ  uential article on this topic, 
Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) conduct a “horse race” between 
three alternative speciﬁ  cations of a Phillips curve model and a 
so-called naïve model that assumes that inﬂ  ation over the next 
year will simply equal what it was over the preceding year. The 
authors conclude that for one-year-ahead forecasts of inﬂ  ation 
over the 1984-99 period, “all three sets of NAIRU Phillips curve–
based inﬂ  ation forecasts have been no more accurate than the 
forecast from our naïve model. . . . We conclude that NAIRU 
Phillips curves are not useful for forecasting inﬂ  ation” (p. 3).
Other researchers have challenged the ﬁ  ndings of Atkeson 
and Ohanian. Stock and Watson (2009) compare the accuracy 
of several different types of inﬂ  ation-forecasting models, 
including “univariate models”—those that rely exclusively on 
one or more past values of inﬂ  ation to predict inﬂ  ation (the 
naïve model described above is a particular example of a uni-
variate model).  As the authors report, “one of our key ﬁ  ndings is 
that the performance of Phillips curve forecasts is episodic: there 
are times, such as the late 1990s, when Phillips curve forecasts 
improved upon univariate forecasts, but there are other times 
(such as the mid-1990s) when a forecaster would have been 
better off using a univariate forecast” (p. 2). Moreover, they ﬁ  nd 
that the times when a Phillips curve model outperforms a 
univariate forecast are those in which the output gap or unem-
ployment gap is relatively large.
Liu and Rudebusch (2010) develop a statistical model in 
which changes in inﬂ  ation in a given period depend on previous 
changes in inﬂ  ation and the previous unemployment gap. They 
also consider a univariate model that includes only the previous 
changes in inﬂ  ation. They estimate the two inﬂ  ation models over a 
sample period from ﬁ  rst-quarter 1984 to fourth-quarter 2007, and 
then generate out-of-sample forecasts for the period from ﬁ  rst-
quarter 2008 through third-quarter 2009.  Judging the accuracy 
of the two models by a measure known as “root mean squared 
error (RMSE)”—the square root of the average squared difference 
between the predicted and the actual values of inﬂ  ation—the 
authors ﬁ  nd that the model with the unemployment gap has an 
RMSE that is only about 25 percent that of the univariate model. 
They conclude that the high level of the unemployment gap during 
2008-09 contributed to the substantial decline in the inﬂ  ation rate 
as predicted by the Phillips curve.
While the studies summarized here appear contradictory, it is 
possible to reconcile the results by arguing that the Phillips curve 
displays threshold effects. That is, the nature of the relationship 
between inﬂ  ation and an activity variable such as the unemploy-
ment gap may change according to whether the gap lies above or 
below a particular value, or threshold. This view is consistent with 
Stock and Watson’s ﬁ  nding that measures of economic activity do 
not help improve the accuracy of inﬂ  ation forecasts in relatively 
  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   3
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; 
Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The unemployment gap is the difference between the actual unemployment 
rate and the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of the non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Core PCE inflation is the personal consumption 
expenditures deflator excluding food and energy. 
Chart 2
The Unemployment Gap and Core PCE Inflation:
Scatter-Plot of the Data
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tranquil periods, but do help to predict inﬂ  ation in periods 
when the unemployment rate deviates markedly from NAIRU. 
The view can also accommodate the seemingly contrary results 
obtained by Atkeson and Ohanian, on the one hand, and Liu and 
Rudebusch, on the other. The authors’ forecast exercises take 
place during very different times—a period of relative tranquility 
in the case of the ﬁ  rst study and a large economic downturn in 
the case of the second.
The idea of a threshold relationship between activity measures 
and inﬂ  ation was previously formalized by Barnes and Olivei 
(2003), who proposed a “piecewise” linear Phillips curve speciﬁ  -
cation. In this type of relationship, depicted in Chart 3, inﬂ ation 
displays little response to movements in the unemployment gap 
that occur between a lower threshold (γL ) and upper threshold 
(γU ), but shows a more pronounced response to movements in 
the unemployment gap outside of this interval. While Barnes 
and Olivei found evidence to support their threshold Phillips 
curve speciﬁ  cation, their analysis ended in 2002. Now, with the 
unemployment rate still quite high nearly two full years into the 
recovery, we believe it would be useful to reexamine the issue of a 
threshold relationship between inﬂ  ation and economic slack with 
the addition of more current data.
Price Inﬂ  ation Phillips Curve Model
Our speciﬁ  cation of the Phillips curve model draws upon 
Gordon’s (1990) “triangle” model of inﬂ  ation with minor modi-
ﬁ  cations. In the triangle model, there are three determinants of 
inﬂ  ation: an inertial component, an activity gap measure, and a 
supply shock variable. Inertia refers to the tendency of inﬂ  ation to 
deviate only gradually from its own past values owing to the slow 
adjustment of inﬂ  ation expectations, proxied here by a weighted 
average of past inﬂ  ation and a measure of long-run (ten-year) 
inﬂ  ation expectations.4 Our activity gap variable—deﬁ  ned as the 
difference between the unemployment rate and the CBO estimate 
of the NAIRU—is meant to account for conditions of tightness 
or slack in the economy.5 The third determinant of inﬂ  ation in 
the model is the supply shock variable.  We use relative import 
price inﬂ  ation, or the growth rate of import prices relative to the 
domestic inﬂ  ation rate, as our supply shock variable.6 While one 
might argue that the exchange value of the dollar should be used 
instead, the fact that the linkage between the exchange rate and 
import prices varies substantially over time makes this measure 
less useful.
Our analysis involves several steps.  First, we estimate a 
Phillips curve model in which the rate of inﬂ  ation is determined 
by a combination of past inﬂ  ation, inﬂ  ation expectations, the 
unemployment gap, and relative import prices.  In this “standard 
model,” the impact of the unemployment gap on inﬂ  ation does 
not change. We then estimate a second model in which we allow 
for the presence of threshold effects, meaning that there are 
values of the unemployment gap beyond which the effect on 
inﬂ  ation differs from what it is when the gap is within those 
thresholds.  The details of this exercise  are provided in the 
accompanying box. Because equations (1) and (2) in the box 
have very different predictions for the role of activity gaps in the 
inﬂ  ation process, it would seem that testing directly for the pres-
ence of threshold effects in the data would be a natural approach 
to evaluate the competing models. Unfortunately, testing for 
threshold effects is complex and the estimation of thresholds also 
involves uncertainty.7 
Because of these difﬁ  culties, we rely on a less formal approach 
to assess the presence of threshold effects. Speciﬁ  cally, we 
examine if there is a marked difference in the estimated slopes 
of the Phillips curve with and without threshold effects and, 
in the threshold case, compare estimates for the interior and 
exterior regions of the curve. In addition, we examine whether 
the forecast proﬁ  le of inﬂ  ation from the threshold Phillips curve 
model is consistent with the recent path of inﬂ  ation, given the 
observed paths of long-run inﬂ  ation expectations, the unem-
ployment gap, and import prices. While these exercises should 
not be viewed as a perfect substitute for more formal testing 
procedures, they are instructive and allow us to gain insights 
into the extent to which activity gaps are useful components of 
empirical models of inﬂ  ation.
4 The inclusion of lagged, or past, inﬂ  ation rates can be viewed either as capturing 
a backward-looking component of inﬂ  ation expectations or as an additional 
source of inertia stemming from wage and price contracts in the economy.
5 See U.S. Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce (2002) for a discussion of how this 
estimate of NAIRU is derived.
6 Oil prices are included as a component in the import price series.  
7 See Hansen (1996, 2000) for a more detailed discussion.
Notes: The chart shows the response of inflation to extreme movements in the 
unemployment gap (the exterior regions) and to more moderate movements in 
the gap (the interior region). The unemployment gap is the difference between 
the actual unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate 
of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
Chart 3
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The Threshold Phillips Curve Model
To understand the threshold Phillips curve model, consider ﬁ  rst the 
speciﬁ  cation of the standard Phillips curve model used in our analysis:
(1)                                                                                                ,
where πt is (annualized) quarterly core PCE inﬂ  ation, πt–1 , . . . ,πt–3 are 
three lagged values of inﬂ  ation, πt–1 is the lagged value of long-run PCE 
inﬂ  ation expectations, ut–1 is the lagged value of the unemployment gap, 
zt–1is the lagged value of the supply shock variable, and εt is an error 
term. The measure of long-run PCE inﬂ  ation expectations is a hybrid 
of two different data series. For the period before fourth-quarter 1991, 
the measure of inﬂ  ation expectations is taken from the Federal Reserve 
Board’s FRB/US model. From fourth-quarter 1991 onward, the series 
is calculated as the ten-year-ahead consumer price index (CPI) inﬂ  ation 
expectations series from the Survey of Professional Forecasters less 
55 basis points to account for the historical difference between the two 
inﬂ  ation series. The unemployment gap is measured as the difference 
between the unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce’s 
estimate of the time-varying NAIRU (u=u–uNAIRU). Relative import price 
inﬂ  ation is measured as the quarterly (annualized) growth rate of import 
prices less quarterly (annualized) core PCE inﬂ  ation (π IMPORT–π).
The threshold Phillips curve model provides a counterpart to the 
standard speciﬁ  cation in equation (1) and is given by:
(2)                                                                                        if
                  otherwise,
where the modiﬁ  cation in equation (2) allows the trade-off between 
inﬂ  ation and unemployment to depend on the level of the unemploy-
ment gap. In particular, we assume that the slope of the Phillips curve 
can change according to whether the unemployment gap lies between 
or outside the threshold values. If the unemployment gap is between the 
lower threshold (γL) and the upper threshold (γU), then the coefﬁ  cient 
βΙ  measures the slope of the Phillips curve in this interior region. By 
contrast, if the unemployment gap lies below the lower threshold or 
above the upper threshold, then the coefﬁ  cient βΕ  measures the slope of 
the Phillips curve in either exterior region. It is assumed that the other 
variables in the model do not produce threshold effects on the inﬂ  ation 
process, although we allow relative import price inﬂ  ation to have 
differential effects before and after 1984.a
Estimation of the threshold Phillips curve model is based on a grid 
search method. Speciﬁ  cally, a range of possible values is speciﬁ  ed for the 
lower threshold and for the upper threshold, with a restriction on the 
range required to ensure that the number of observations in the interior 
and exterior regions is sufﬁ  cient for model estimation. We allow the 
symmetric values of the lower (upper) threshold to range from -1.8 (1.8) 
to -0.3 (0.3), with the threshold values changing in increments of 0.01 
within these ranges.b  We also restrict the slope of the Phillips curve to be 
the same below the lower threshold and above the upper threshold. The 
estimation procedure then selects as the thresholds those combinations 
that result in the lowest sum of squared residuals. 
The estimation results for the standard and threshold Phillips curve 
models are presented below.
Phillips Curve Model Estimates





 0.440  ***
  (0.070)
 0.433  ***
  (0.070)
α2
 0.193  **
  (0.076)
 0.187  **
  (0.076)
α3
 0.157  **
  (0.068)
 0.163  **
  (0.067)
λ  0.211  ***
  (0.044)
 0.217  ***
  (0.044)
β   -0.144 ***
  (0.045)         —
βI         —   -0.077
  (0.080)




 0.055  ***
  (0.007)








R2  0.90  0.90
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
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a See Taylor (2000) and Hooker (2002) for further discussion. These studies 
document a decline since the mid-1980s in the impact of import prices and oil 
prices on the U.S. inﬂ  ation process, and ascribe this development to the conduct of 
monetary policy and the establishment of a credible low-inﬂ  ation environment.
b Once values are speciﬁ  ed for γL and
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Estimation Results
The measure of inﬂ  ation whose movements we seek to explain is 
the annualized quarterly percentage change in the core PCE deﬂ  a-
tor. The models for core PCE deﬂ  ator inﬂ  ation are estimated over 
the period from ﬁ  rst-quarter 1961 through fourth-quarter 2007 
to mitigate the inﬂ  uence of the Great Recession. The estimation 
results are presented in the table on page 5.8 The regression results 
for the standard Phillips curve yield a statistically signiﬁ  cant slope 
estimate of -0.14. For the threshold Phillips curve model, two key 
results emerge. First, the estimated (absolute) value of the “thresh-
old” unemployment gap is 1.56 percentage points. This ﬁ  gure is 
very close to the 1.5 percentage point ﬁ  gure identiﬁ  ed by Stock 
and Watson (2009) as the threshold beyond which Phillips curve 
models provide forecast improvements over univariate models for 
inﬂ  ation.9 As shown in Chart 4, which presents a long time series 
of the unemployment gap, there have been relatively few episodes 
when it has exceeded these estimated thresholds.  Four episodes, 
including the most recent, correspond to particularly severe 
recessions. Another, over the second half of the 1960s and into 
the early 1970s, corresponds to an extended period of intense 
resource utilization.  The second key ﬁ  nding is that the slopes 
associated with the thresholds differ markedly in both economic 
8 To ensure that there is no long-run trade-off between inﬂ  ation and unemploy-
ment, we undertake estimation of both models imposing the constraint that the 
coefﬁ  cients on lagged inﬂ  ation and the measure of inﬂ  ation expectations sum to 
unity. This restriction was not rejected for either model.
9 Barnes and Olivei (2003) allow for asymmetric thresholds and report estimates 
of -1.4 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively, for the lower and upper thresholds 
of their core PCE deﬂ  ator Phillips curve model. When we allow for asymmetric 
thresholds, we obtain similar estimates of -1.3 percent and 1.1 percent. We elected 
to estimate the model with symmetric thresholds so that we could compare our 
ﬁ  ndings with those of Stock and Watson (2009), who incorporate more recent data. 
and statistical signiﬁ  cance. The estimated slope in the exterior 
region is -0.17 and is statistically signiﬁ  cant, but the estimated 
slope declines to -0.07 and is not statistically signiﬁ  cant when 
the unemployment gap lies in the interior region. 
The initial results are consistent with the idea that the link 
from activity gaps to inﬂ  ation is episodic—that is, the relation-
ship is relevant only when conditions in the economy are either 
extremely slack or extremely tight. To examine the threshold 
Phillips curve model’s usefulness as a forecasting tool, we 
conduct a dynamic simulation to judge how well the model’s 
forecasts track the recent path of inﬂ  ation. For the simulation, 
we retain the model’s estimated parameters through the fourth 
quarter of 2007 to generate a one-quarter-ahead predicted value 
for ﬁ  rst-quarter 2008 core PCE inﬂ  ation. We then repeat the 
exercise for each subsequent period using the actual paths of 
long-run inﬂ  ation expectations, the unemployment gap, and 
import prices as the explanatory variables. No actual values of 
inﬂ  ation over the recent recession are used in the simulation. 
Rather, the simulation uses the post-2007 inﬂ  ation forecasts from 
the model to forecast the subsequent values of inﬂ  ation.  In this 
manner, we generate a sequence of core PCE inﬂ  ation forecasts 
for the period from ﬁ  rst-quarter 2008 to fourth-quarter 2010.
Importantly, the one-quarter-ahead inﬂ  ation forecasts produced 
by our dynamic simulation generally track the slowing observed 
in actual core PCE inﬂ  ation since the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2008 
(Chart 5).10 To be sure, there have been some large deviations 
between the realized and forecasted values on a quarter-to quarter 
basis. For example, forecasted inﬂ  ation appears to have lagged 
10 As a robustness check, we experimented with different choices for the 
thresholds but found that the slope estimates of the Phillips curve and the 
inﬂ  ation forecast proﬁ  les did not materially change.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; Congressional Budget Office; authors’ 
calculations. 
Note: The unemployment gap is the difference between the actual unemployment rate 
and the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of the non-accelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment (NAIRU).
Chart 4
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations.
Note: Core PCE inflation is the personal consumption expenditures deflator excluding 
food and energy.
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Phillips Curve Model Forecasts
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the deceleration of actual inﬂ  ation through the middle of second-
quarter 2009, perhaps because of the role of inertia in the model. In 
addition, actual core inﬂ  ation rose and then stabilized in 2009 while 
its forecasted value continued to decline. More recently, however, 
actual core inﬂ  ation has moved signiﬁ  cantly lower—as predicted 
by the model forecasts—with the model also pointing to some risk 
of deﬂ  ation. It is important to note that the observed downward 
trend in actual and forecasted inﬂ  ation occurs in spite of the fact 
that inﬂ  ation expectations have remained quite steady: speciﬁ  cally, 
the inﬂ  ation expectations series used in our model essentially held 
steady at 2 percent over the out-of-sample forecast exercise.  
Conclusion
There has been considerable debate recently about the role of 
slack in the inﬂ  ation process. Our study contributes to the debate 
by presenting evidence that the relationship between labor 
market slack and inﬂ  ation is nonlinear—in particular, slack must 
exceed a threshold before exerting a statistically and economi-
cally signiﬁ  cant effect on inﬂ  ation. Importantly, our threshold 
model tracks the considerable slowing of core inﬂ  ation that has 
occurred since the end of 2007 and can therefore serve as a useful 
guide in the monetary policy process.
Nevertheless, we recognize that some caution should be 
exercised in the interpretation of our results. For example, 
there is little theoretical work to explain the piecewise linear 
Phillips curve. In addition, there is a general absence of episodes 
in which low inﬂ  ation and large unemployment gaps coincided 
in the sample period. Finally, the single-equation threshold 
Phillips curve model assumes that inﬂ  ation expectations are 
not inﬂ  uenced by other variables in the model. It is likely, 
however, that inﬂ  ation expectations are inﬂ  uenced by the 
amount of slack in the economy, which in turn could affect 
the estimates of the thresholds. While beyond the scope of 
this article, an interesting extension of our work would be the 
estimation of a multi-equation model that would treat inﬂ  a-
tion expectations as being inﬂ  uenced by variables such as the 
unemployment gap.
We are grateful to Giovanni Olivei of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston for his assistance and helpful comments.
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